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Abstract 
Diversion from the criminal justice system pursuant to s 32 of the Mental 
Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) is increasingly being deployed 
as a key response to the issues facing people diagnosed with cognitive 
impairment and/or mental illness in the criminal justice system. The ‘medical 
model’ of disability, which is focused on disability as an internal, individual 
pathology, contributes to the marginalisation of people with disability, notably 
by providing a legitimate basis for the legal and social regulation of people with 
disability through therapeutic interventions. The scholarly field of critical 
disability studies contests the medical model by making apparent the social and 
political contingency of disability, including the intersection of disability with 
other dimensions of politicised identity (such as gender and Indigeneity) and 
the role of law and institutions (including the criminal justice system) in the 
disablement, marginalisation and criminalisation of people with disability. 
Applying critical disability studies to s 32 problematises the characterisation of 
the legal subject with diagnosed impairment and this provides a new basis for 
questioning the coercion of people with disability through the criminal justice 
intervention of diversion. An empirical analysis of the diagnostics, 
demographics and criminal justice pathways of a sample of individuals who 
have received s 32 orders provides some material foundations for a more 
politically and socially directed analysis of s 32 and for a broader reflection on 
the role of the criminal law in issues facing people diagnosed with cognitive 
impairments and mental illness in the criminal justice system. 
I Introduction 
Diversion from the criminal justice system pursuant to s 32 of the Mental Health 
(Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) (‘MHFP Act’) is increasingly being 
deployed as a key response to the issues facing people diagnosed with cognitive 
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impairment and/or mental illness in the criminal justice system. Pursuant to s 32, 
individuals diagnosed with cognitive impairment and/or mental illness appearing in 
the New South Wales (‘NSW’) Local Court and NSW Children’s Court can have 
their charges dismissed prior to conviction, generally conditional on compliance 
with a six-month court order requiring engagement with disability services and 
mental health treatment. 
Law reform organisations, legal professionals, disability advocacy 
organisations and criminal justice and forensic mental health and disability service 
providers1 and a relatively small body of legal scholarship support s 32 on the basis 
that it is humane and therapeutic.2 Section 32 is considered humane because it 
moves an individual with cognitive impairment or mental illness away from 
exposure to the negative effects of the court process and imprisonment and to 
disability and mental health community support services that will enhance the 
individual’s ability to live in the community. Section 32 is viewed as therapeutic in 
providing a pathway to disability and mental health services that are presumed to 
address the offending behaviour assumed to be intrinsic to the impairments of 
individuals with cognitive impairment and/or mental illness. As well as its 
characterisation as humane and therapeutic, s 32 is increasingly recognised as a 
significant component of the criminal law’s role in addressing the issues facing 
individuals with disability in the criminal justice system. This is most evident in 
the recent NSW Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’) review of people with 
																																																								
1 The support for s 32 is most recently evident in the consistent support that the provision has 
received in public submissions made to the New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
(‘NSWLRC’) review of persons with mental health and cognitive impairment in the criminal 
justice system: NSWLRC, People with Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in the Criminal 
Justice System — Submissions <http://www.lawreform.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/lrc/lrc_completed 
_projects/lrc_completedprojects2010.aspx>. In relation to law reform organisations see NSWLRC, 
People with Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in the Criminal Justice System: Diversion, 
Consultation Paper No 7 (2010) (‘NSWLRC Consultation Paper No 7’); NSWLRC, People with 
Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in the Criminal Justice System: Diversion, Report No 
135 (2012) (‘NSWLRC Report No 135’). In relation to disability advocacy organisations, see 
Andrew Howell and Linda Steele, ‘Enabling Justice — A Report on Problems and Solutions in 
Relation to Diversion of Alleged Offenders with Intellectual Disability from the New South Wales 
Local Courts System: With Particular Reference to the Practical Operation of s 32 of the Mental 
Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW)’ (Report, Intellectual Disability Rights Service, May 
2008); Nick Rushworth, ‘Out of Sight, Out of Mind: People with an Acquired Brain Injury and the 
Criminal Justice System’ (Policy Paper, Brain Injury Australia, July 2011). In relation to legal 
professionals, see Peter McGhee and Siobhan Mullany, ‘Keeping People with Intellectual 
Disability Out of Jail’ (2007) 83 Precedent 16; Peter McGhee and Lee-May Saw, ‘Chiselling the 
Bars: Acting for People with an Intellectual Disability’ (2005) 43(9) Law Society Journal 61; Karen 
Weeks, ‘To Section 32 or Not?: Applications under s 32 Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 
1990 in the Local Court’ (2010) 48(4) Law Society Journal 49. In relation to forensic mental health 
and disability service providers, see David Greenberg and Ben Nielsen, ‘Court Diversion in NSW 
for People with Mental Health Problems and Disorders’ (2002) 13(7) NSW Public Health Bulletin 
158; David Greenberg and Ben Nielsen, ‘Moving Towards a Statewide Approach to Court 
Diversion Services in NSW’ (2003) 14(11–12) NSW Public Health Bulletin 227. 
2 Elizabeth Richardson and Bernadette McSherry, ‘Diversion Down Under — Programs for 
Offenders with Mental Illnesses in Australia’ (2010) 33(4) International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry 249; Tamara Walsh, ‘Diverting Mentally Ill Women Away from Prison in New South 
Wales: Building on the Existing System’ (2003) 10(1) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 227. 
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cognitive and mental health impairments in the criminal justice system, which 
devotes an entire consultation paper and final report to diversion.3 
Despite its growing popularity, s 32 remains largely immune from scholarly 
analysis directed towards questioning its social and political contexts, and analysis 
of its underlying assumptions and systemic effects.4 Instead, commentary is 
concentrated on fine-tuning the legal framework, increasing the number of orders 
made and enhancing the effectiveness of compliance with s 32 orders. Of particular 
significance is the absence of scholarly analysis of s 32’s coercive effects. 
Section 32 has coercive effects because diversion into disability services and 
mental health treatment is legally effected by a court order pursuant to which an 
individual must engage with the specified services and/or treatment. A failure to 
comply with the order brings that individual back to court to have his or her 
original charges determined. The coercive effects of s 32 orders apply only to 
people with cognitive impairment and/or mental illness (who, moreover, have not 
been convicted of any criminal offences).5 These complex issues in s 32 around 
coercion, disability and criminal law are yet to be fully considered in legal 
scholarship. 
Critical disability studies scholarship provides new possibilities for 
analysing coercion of people with cognitive impairment and/or mental illness 
through s 32. It contests the ‘medical model’ focus on disability as internal, 
individual pathology, and makes apparent the social and political contingency of 
disability, including the intersection of disability with other dimensions of 
politicised identity (such as gender and Indigeneity) and the complex role of law 
and institutions (including the criminal justice system) in the disablement, 
marginalisation and criminalisation of people with disability. 
A critical disability studies lens reveals the figure of the legal subject with 
diagnosed impairment as central to s 32 — that is, in order for an individual to be 
subject to s 32’s jurisdiction, the individual must be ‘developmentally disabled’, 
‘suffering from mental illness’ or ‘suffering from a mental condition for which 
treatment is available in a mental health facility’.6 It is this legal subject that then 
grounds the use of therapeutic interventions targeted at the diagnosed impairment 
in s 32 orders. Thus, one approach to contest the coercive effects of s 32, is to 
problematise the core figure of the legal subject with diagnosed impairment. This 
article does this by making apparent the social and political dimensions of the 
embodied individuals who receive s 32 orders, specifically by developing 
knowledge on their identities beyond diagnosed impairment and their criminal 
justice pathways beyond the s 32 order. The article draws on a study of 149 
individuals with diagnosed cognitive impairment and/or mental illness who have 
been in custody in a NSW prison and have received a s 32 order at some point in 
																																																								
3 NSWLRC Consultation Paper No 7, above n 1; NSWLRC Report No 135, above n 1. 
4 However, see Linda Roslyn Steele, Disability at the Margins: Diversion, Cognitive Impairment and 
the Criminal Law (PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 2014); Linda Steele, ‘Diversion of Individuals 
with Disability from the Criminal Justice System: Control Inside or Outside Criminal Law?’ in 
Alan Reed, Chris Ashford and Nicola Wake (eds), Consent and Control: Legal Perspectives on 
State Power (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, forthcoming). 
5 Steele, ‘Diversion of Individuals with Disability from the Criminal Justice System’, above n 4. 
6 MHFP Act s 32(1)(a). 
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their lives (‘the s 32 subjects’). The findings paint a detailed picture of individuals 
characterised by complex diagnostic, demographic and criminal justice dimensions 
not previously articulated. This unsettles the idea of diagnosed impairment as both 
a way to characterise these individuals as legal subjects and, in turn, as an 
appropriate basis for legitimising the coercive intervention in their lives that occur 
through s 32 orders. These findings will have relevance to other jurisdictions both 
in Australia and internationally, in light of the growing popularity of diversion.7 
The article calls into question the appropriateness of s 32 as a mechanism 
for addressing the systemic issues for individuals diagnosed with cognitive 
impairment and/or mental illness in the criminal justice system. We urge scholars, 
law reformers and disability rights advocates to ask deeper questions about the use 
of diagnosed impairment as a legal category, the capacity of criminal law to 
acknowledge its own marginalising effects and ultimately the appropriateness of 
therapeutic interventions through criminal law.  
Part II provides an overview of the legal framework of s 32 and identifies 
its coercive effects. Part III then introduces and draws on critical disability studies 
to establish the centrality to s 32 of the legal subject with diagnosed impairment 
and the basis for problematising diagnosed impairment through making apparent 
the social and political dimensions of the embodied individuals who receive s 32 
orders. Part IV outlines the study methodology and the approach to empirical 
analysis. Parts V–VIII examine the findings of the empirical analysis on the 
complex nature of diagnosed impairment for s 32 subjects, the compounding 
effects of other politicised aspects of identity including gender and Indigeneity, 
and social disadvantage and trends in the criminal justice pathways of the s 32 
subjects. The article concludes in Part IX by identifying some of the ways in which 
this more nuanced picture of individuals who are subject to s 32 orders calls into 
question its coercive effects and provides some material foundations for a more 
politically and socially directed analysis of s 32. The article ultimately calls for a 
broader reflection on the role of criminal law in the issues facing people diagnosed 
with cognitive impairments and/or mental illness in the criminal justice system. 
II The Legal Framework of Section 32 
Pursuant to s 32 of the MHFP Act, a defendant diagnosed with cognitive 
impairment and/or mental illness appearing in the NSW Local Court or the NSW 
Children’s Court can be made subject to a court order that provides for the 
dismissal of that defendant’s criminal charges.8 A s 32 application can be made at 
any time during the Local Court proceedings concerning the defendant’s charges.9 
An application is generally made by way of an oral application by the defence in 
																																																								
7 Susanna Every-Palmer et al, ‘Review of Psychiatric Services to Mentally Disordered Offenders 
Around the Pacific Rim’ (2014) 6(1) Asia-Pacific Psychiatry 1; Richardson and McSherry, above 
n 2; Richard D Schneider, ‘Mental Health Courts and Diversion Programs: A Global Survey’ 
(2010) 33(4) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 201. 
8 MHFP Act ss 3(1) (definition of ‘Magistrate’), 32. 
9 This includes whether or not a defendant is fit to plead and whether or not a plea has been entered: 
Perry v Forbes (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Smart J, 21 May 1993); Mantell 
v Molyneux (2006) 68 NSWLR 46, 59–60 [49]. 
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the course of the proceedings. It is typically accompanied by two documents: (i) a 
psychological, psychiatric or neuropsychological report detailing the defendant’s 
diagnosis; and (ii) a ‘treatment plan’ or ‘case plan’ by a disability or mental health 
service outlining the treatment and services that the defendant could access under a 
conditional s 32 order.10 
A magistrate can make a s 32 order following a three-stage inquiry (the ‘El 
Mawas inquiry’) based on ss 32(1)–(3) of the MHFP Act and laid out in the NSW 
Court of Appeal decision of Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v El Mawas.11 
The first stage of the inquiry is whether the defendant is ‘developmentally 
disabled’, ‘suffering from mental illness’ or ‘suffering from a mental condition for 
which treatment is available in a mental health facility’.12 The first stage was 
characterised by McColl JA as the ‘jurisdictional question’ of s 32 because the 
court’s jurisdiction or authority to deal with an individual pursuant to this 
provision is dependent upon the finding of fact of the impairment in relation to that 
individual.13 
The second stage of the inquiry is whether it is ‘more appropriate’ for the 
defendant to be dealt with by s 32 ‘than otherwise in accordance with law’.14 While 
the first stage of the El Mawas inquiry is the observation of a ‘fact’, the second stage 
is a discretionary judgement involving the consideration of a number of factors.15 
The third stage of the El Mawas inquiry is whether an appropriate s 32 
order can be made.16 At this stage, the magistrate considers whether an 
unconditional or conditional order is appropriate, and whether there are the 
necessary services and treatment available to make any conditional order 
contemplated. Overall, the magistrate balances 
the public interest in those charged with a criminal offence facing the full 
weight of the law against the public interest in treating, or regulating to the 
greatest extent practical, the conduct of individuals suffering from [the 
relevant impairment] with the object of ensuring that the community is 
protected from the conduct of such persons.17 
If appropriate in light of the El Mawas inquiry, the magistrate can make:  
a s 32 order18 dismissing the defendant’s charges either unconditionally;19 a six-
																																																								
10 Intellectual Disability Rights Service, Step By Step Guide to Making a Section 32 Application for a 
Person with Intellectual Disability (2011) 22–32. 
11 (2006) 66 NSWLR 93, 109–10 [75]–[80] (McColl JA) (‘El Mawas’). 
12 MHFP Act s 32(1)(a). 
13 El Mawas (2006) 66 NSWLR 93, 109 [75] (McColl JA).  
14 MHFP Act s 32(1)(b). 
15 Particular factors have been identified in the case law. See El Mawas (2006) 66 NSWLR 93, 95 [6], 
[8], [10] (Spigelman CJ), 109–10 [77]–[79], [84] (McColl JA); Mantell v Molyneux (2006) 68 
NSWLR 46, 57–8 [40]–[41], 59 [47]–[48]; DPP (NSW) v Soliman [2013] NSWSC 346 (16 April 
2013) [59]. See also Broome v Liristis [2011] NSWDC 40 (15 June 2011) [40]–[42]; Police v 
Goodworth [2007] NSWLC 2 (28 March 2007) [1]; Police v Winter [2008] NSWLC 15 (22 August 
2008); Quinn v DPP (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 331 (16 October 2015). 
16 El Mawas (2006) 66 NSWLR 93, 110 [80] (McColl JA). 
17 Ibid 108 [71] (McColl JA). 
18 For the suggested form that the s 32 order should take, see Judicial Commission of New South 
Wales, Local Court Bench Book (at Service 117) [35-060]. 
19 MHFP Act s 32(3)(c). 
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month conditional s 32 order;20 or an interim s 32 order that places conditions on a 
defendant for a period prior to determination of the charges.21 A conditional s 32 
order pursuant to s 32(3) involves dismissal of an individual’s charges and 
discharge from the court process, coupled with the individual either being put into 
the care of a responsible person or being required to be assessed or treated. This 
generally involves being discharged into the care of a case manager or treating 
mental health professional specified in the treatment or support plan submitted by 
the defence; and/or having to comply with all reasonable directions made by that 
case manager or treating mental health professional. Individuals might also be 
discharged conditional on attending appointments for assessment and treatment. 
There is a period of six months after the making of a conditional s 32 order during 
which service providers can report a breach of a conditional s 32 order.22  
A defendant can be called back before the court and, if the breach is made out, 
possibly have their charges heard afresh.23 
While diversion into disability services and mental health treatment in s 32 is 
typically framed as humane and beneficial compared with prison, the legal 
framework of s 32 demonstrates the coercive effects of conditional s 32 orders. 
Diversion is legally effected by a court order pursuant to which an individual must 
engage with the specified services and/or treatment because a failure to do so brings 
that individual back to court to have his or her original charges determined. 
Moreover, the coercive effects of s 32 orders apply only to people with cognitive 
impairment and/or mental illness by reason of the jurisdictional question of s 32, 
coupled with the particular disability-related factors relevant to the appropriateness 
of an order (at the second stage of the El Mawas inquiry) and the use of disability 
services and mental health treatment in conditional s 32 orders.24 
III Contesting Coercion: Questioning ‘Diagnosed 
Impairment’ in Section 32 
Critical disability studies scholarship provides new possibilities for contesting the 
coercion of people with cognitive impairment and/or mental illness through s 32 by 
problematising the medicalisation of disability and the regulative possibilities 
associated with medicalisation. As Devlin and Pothier suggest: ‘disability is not 
fundamentally a question of medicine or health, nor is it just an issue of sensitivity 
and compassion; rather, it is a question of politics and power(lessness)’.25 Critical 
disability studies scholarship questions a focus on individual pathology. Instead, it 
draws attention to the marginalisation of people with disability and questions the 
function of diagnostic categorisation as a legitimate basis for the legal and social 
regulation of people with disability, including through therapeutic interventions 
																																																								
20 Ibid ss 32(3)(a)–(b), (3A), (3D). 
21 Ibid s 32(2). 
22 Ibid s 32A. 
23 Ibid ss 32(3A)–(3D).  
24 Steele, ‘Diversion of Individuals with Disability from the Criminal Justice System’, above n 4. 
25 Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier, ‘Introduction: Toward a Critical Theory of Dis-Citizenship’ in 
Dianne Pothier and Richard Devlin (eds), Critical Disability Theory: Essays in Philosophy, 
Politics, Policy, and Law (UBC Press, 2006) 1, 2. 
2016] A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF DIVERSION 185 
and the use of disability services to structure life choices.26 This approach makes 
apparent the social and political contingency of disability, including the 
intersection of disability with other dimensions of politicised identity (such as 
gender and Indigeneity);27 the relationship of the emergence of impairment to 
historical and geopolitical dimensions of power and inequality;28 and the complex 
role of law and institutions (including the criminal justice system) in the 
disablement and criminalisation of people with disability.29 
																																																								
26 See, eg, Dan Goodley, Dis/Ability Studies: Theorising Disablism and Ableism (Routledge, 2014). 
See also Mairian Corker and Tom Shakespeare, ‘Mapping the Terrain’ in Mairian Corker and Tom 
Shakespeare (eds), Disability/Postmodernity: Embodying Disability Theory (Continuum, 2002) 1; 
Shelley Tremain, ‘Foucault, Governmentality, and Critical Disability Theory: An Introduction’ in 
Shelley Tremain (ed), Foucault and the Government of Disability (University of Michigan Press, 
2005) 1; Shelley Tremain, ‘On the Subject of Impairment’ in Mairian Corker and Tom Shakespeare 
(eds), Disability/Postmodernity: Embodying Disability Theory (Continuum, 2002) 32. 
27 Nirmala Erevelles, Disability and Difference in Global Contexts: Enabling a Transformative Body 
Politic (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Camilla Lundberg and Eva Simonsen, ‘Disability in Court: 
Intersectionality and Rule of Law’ (2015) 17(Supplement 1) Scandinavian Journal of Disability 
Research 7; Helen Meekosha, ‘What the Hell are You? An Intercategorical Analysis of Race, 
Ethnicity, Gender and Disability in the Australian Body Politic’ (2006) 8(2–3) Scandinavian 
Journal of Disability Research 161. 
28 See, eg, Raewyn Connell, ‘Southern Bodies and Disability: Re-Thinking Concepts’ (2011) 32(8) 
Third World Quarterly 1369; Leanne Dowse, Eileen Baldry and Phillip Snoyman, ‘Disabling 
Criminology: Conceptualising the Intersections of Critical Disability Studies and Critical 
Criminology for People with Mental Health and Cognitive Disabilities in the Criminal Justice 
System’ (2009) 15(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 29; Erevelles, above n 27; David 
Hollinsworth, ‘Decolonizing Indigenous Disability in Australia’ (2013) 28(5) Disability & Society 
601; Beth Ribet, ‘Naming Prison Rape as Disablement: A Critical Analysis of the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Imperatives of Survivor-Oriented 
Advocacy’ (2010) 17(2) Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 281; Beth Ribet, ‘Surfacing 
Disability Through a Critical Race Theoretical Paradigm’ (2010) 2(2) Georgetown Journal of Law 
& Modern Critical Race Perspectives 209; Beth Ribet, ‘Emergent Disability and the Limits of 
Equality: A Critical Reading of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ 
(2011) 14(1) Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 155; Ivan Eugene Watts and 
Nirmala Erevelles, ‘These Deadly Times: Reconceptualizing School Violence by Using Critical 
Race Theory and Disability Studies’ (2004) 41(2) American Educational Research Journal 271. 
29 In an empirical context in Australia, see Eileen Baldry, Leanne Dowse and Melissa Clarence, 
‘People with Intellectual and Other Cognitive Disability in the Criminal Justice System’ (Report, 
NSW Family & Community Services: Ageing, Disability & Home Care, December 2012). On a 
more theoretical level, see generally Liat Ben-Moshe, Chris Chapman and Allison C Carey (eds), 
Disability Incarcerated: Imprisonment and Disability in the United States and Canada (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014); Dowse, Baldry and Snoyman, above n 28. There is a growing body of literature 
highlighting the issues concerning Indigenous Australians with disability in the criminal justice 
system: Eileen Baldry et al, A Predictable and Preventable Path: Aboriginal People with Mental 
and Cognitive Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System (2015); Peta MacGillivray and Eileen 
Baldry, ‘Indigenous Australians, Mental and Cognitive Impairment and the Criminal Justice 
System: A Complex Web’ (2013) 8(9) Indigenous Law Bulletin 22; Tom Calma, ‘Preventing Crime 
and Promoting Rights for Indigenous Young People with Cognitive Disabilities and Mental Health 
Issues’ (Report No 3, Australian Human Rights Commission, March 2008); Jim Simpson and 
Mindy Sotiri, ‘Criminal Justice and Indigenous People with Cognitive Disabilities’ (Discussion 
Paper, Beyond Bars Alliance, 2004); Mindy Sotiri, Patrick McGee and Eileen Baldry, ‘No End in 
Sight: The Imprisonment, and Indefinite Detention of Indigenous Australians with a Cognitive 
Impairment’ (Report, Aboriginal Disability Justice Campaign, September 2012); Julian Trofimovs 
and Leanne Dowse, ‘Mental Health at the Intersections: The Impact of Complex Needs on Police 
Contact and Custody for Indigenous Australian Men’ (2014) 37(4) International Journal of Law 
and Psychiatry 390. In relation to Indigeneity, race, disability and the criminal justice system on a 
more theoretical level, see, eg, Chris Chapman, ‘Five Centuries’ Material Reforms and Ethical 
Reformulations of Social Elimination’ in Liat Ben-Moshe, Chris Chapman and Allison C Carey 
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Critical disability scholars have argued that diagnosed impairment can be 
analysed as ‘disciplinary’.30 This is because diagnostic definitions of impairment 
provide norms of behaviour and functioning against which individuals are 
measured. This measurement is not merely for the purpose of a retrospective and 
static description. Rather, it provides a basis for intervention in order to remedy or 
manage the individuals’ deviations from the norms. Intervention is framed in 
humane, therapeutic and empowering terms, angled toward achieving integration 
with predetermined social norms.31 Coupled with this, critical disability studies 
scholars have recognised the regulative nature of disability services and mental 
health treatment in a post-deinstitutionalisation context,32 as well as the way in 
which legal orders can harness these to enable regulation of people with 
disability.33 
Critical disability studies scholarship provides new possibilities for 
challenging the coercion of people with cognitive impairment and/or mental illness 
through s 32 for two main reasons. First, it illuminates the centrality to s 32 of an 
understanding of cognitive impairment and mental illness as diagnosed impairment 
and its characterisation of the s 32 subjects as legal subjects so diagnosed. Second, 
it provides a way to contest diagnosed impairment and its use in s 32 for regulative 
ends by directing analytical attention to the social and political contingency of 
disability in individuals who receive s 32 orders. 
Central to s 32 is the figure of the legal subject with diagnosed impairment. 
First, in relation to the legislative framework of s 32, diagnosed impairment is at 
every stage of the El Mawas inquiry. The ‘jurisdictional question’ of s 32 — the 
legal gateway to an individual being considered for a s 32 order — is that the 
individual has a ‘diagnosed impairment’. This entails a scientific, value-neutral 
approach prioritising internal psychological processes (for example, ‘learning’ and 
‘comprehension’) and their connection to diagnostic labels (for example, 
																																																																																																																																
(eds), Disability Incarcerated: Imprisonment and Disability in the United States and Canada 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 25; Hollinsworth, above n 28; Ribet, ‘Naming Prison Rape as 
Disablement’, above n 28; Watts and Erevelles, above n 28. 
30 See, eg, Tremain, ‘Foucault, Governmentality, and Critical Disability Theory’, above n 26; 
Tremain, ‘On the Subject of Impairment’, above n 26. 
31 See, eg, Tremain, ‘Foucault, Governmentality, and Critical Disability Theory’, above n 26, 10–11. 
32 In the context of disability support services for people with intellectual disability, see, eg, Chris 
Drinkwater, ‘Supported Living and the Production of Individuals’ in Shelley Tremain (ed), 
Foucault and the Government of Disability (University of Michigan Press, 2005) 229; Jack 
Levinson, Making Life Work: Freedom and Disability in a Community Group Home (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010); Karl Nunkoosing and Mark Haydon-Laurelut, ‘Intellectual Disability 
Trouble: Foucault and Goffman on “Challenging Behaviour”’ in Dan Goodley, Bill Hughes and 
Lennard Davis (eds), Disability and Social Theory: New Developments and Directions (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012) 195. In the context of mental health treatment provided pursuant to community 
treatment orders, see, eg, Erick Fabris, Tranquil Prisons: Chemical Incarceration under 
Community Treatment Orders (University of Toronto Press, 2011). 
33 See, eg, Fabris, above n 32; Claire Spivakovsky, ‘From Punishment to Protection: Containing and 
Controlling the Lives of People with Disabilities in Human Rights’ (2014) 16(5) Punishment & 
Society 560; Claire Spivakovsky, ‘Making Risk and Dangerousness Intelligible in Intellectual 
Disability’ (2014) 23(3) Griffith Law Review 389; Claire Spivakovsky, ‘Human Rights and the 
Governance of Cognitive Impairment and Mental Illness’ in L Weber, E Fishwick and M Marmo 
(eds), The Routledge International Handbook of Criminology and Human Rights (Routledge, 
forthcoming). 
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‘intellectual disability’) attributed to individuals following an expert process of 
diagnosis. Importantly, the individual is not someone with disability among other 
features, but instead is negatively defined as an individual who is ‘developmentally 
disabled’, ‘suffering from mental illness’ or ‘suffering from a mental condition’.34 
Diagnosed impairment becomes a (legal) ‘synecdoche’35 for the individual, a 
‘contamination of identity’, whereby an individual’s condition is ‘understood to be 
embedded in the very fabric of their physical and moral [or, in this case, legal] 
personhood’.36 
The second and third stages of the El Mawas inquiry similarly focus on 
diagnosed impairment. In the second stage, the court considers the implications of 
the diagnosed impairment for the most appropriate mainstream and diversionary 
criminal justice system option. At the third stage, the court considers the 
impairment in order to determine the disability service and mental health treatment 
interventions that will treat or regulate the impairment. Here, the documents 
submitted by the defence in support of the s 32 application are central to this 
characterisation insofar as they are produced by mental health and disability 
professionals and are focused on diagnosis itself and the appropriately matched 
treatment and services. The conditional s 32 orders themselves utilise disability 
services and mental health treatment to structure individuals’ lives in a manner that 
limits their choices and spatial location, and modifies their mood, physical activity 
and behaviour.37 As we have argued here, the critical disability studies paradigm 
contests the self-evident nature of this medicalisation and the regulation it permits. 
IV Researching Who Receives Section 32 Orders 
This article now turns to an empirical investigation of a sample of individuals 
subject to s 32 in NSW. In presenting this data, we consider how diagnosed 
impairment in s 32 might be problematised by shifting away from how law 
represents those it acts upon, to making apparent the social and political 
dimensions of the embodied individuals who receive s 32 orders. 
A The Existing Research 
To date, the small body of empirical research on individuals who receive s 32 
orders has been principally quantitative in nature and focused on s 32 use, with 
some quantification by reference to diagnosis.38 This offers limited insights39 and 
																																																								
34 MHFP Act s 32(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
35 Catherine Mills, Futures of Reproduction: Bioethics and Biopolitics (Springer, 2011) 71 n 48. 
36 David T Mitchell and Sharon L Snyder, ‘Introduction: Disability Studies and the Double Bind of 
Representation’ in David T Mitchell and Sharon L Snyder (eds), The Body and Physical 
Difference: Discourses of Disability (University of Michigan Press, 1997) 1, 3, quoting Robert 
Murphy. 
37 See above n 31. 
38 Karen Freeman, ‘Mental Health and the Criminal Justice System’ (1998) 38 Crime and Justice 
Bulletin 1; Tom Gotsis and Hugh Donnelly, ‘Diverting Mentally Disordered Offenders in the NSW 
Local Court’ (Monograph 31, Judicial Commission of NSW, March 2008) 4, 20–1; Jenna Macnab, 
‘S32/33 Research: A Report on Successful Orders Provided under Sections 32 and/or 33 of the 
Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act NSW 1990 with Respect to People with an Intellectual 
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forecloses broader social and political analysis by focusing only on individuals’ 
diagnosed impairment at the moment of the order, ignoring their longitudinal 
criminal justice involvement and the possibly harmful and criminalising effects of 
the criminal justice system itself. Together with its focus on the counting of orders, 
research presenting the empirical ‘realities’ of individuals who receive s 32 orders 
serves to confirm the need for s 32 and for criminal law intervention by the state in 
the lives of people diagnosed with cognitive impairment and/or mental illness. In 
order to problematise this characterisation of individuals by reference to diagnosed 
impairment and expose the centrality of this to s 32’s coercive effects, the 
following section presents an empirical examination of a sample of individuals 
who received s 32 orders under the MHFP Act. 
B An Alternative Empirical Approach 
The empirical approach utilised in the study reported here40 involves quantitative 
analysis of data related to the use of s 32 orders for 149 individuals diagnosed with 
cognitive impairment and/or mental illness who have come before the Children’s 
and Local Courts in NSW as a result of an offence at any time preceding the draw 
of the data. There is no data available on the use of s 32 orders specifically in 
relation to individuals who have never been in custody, so the sample is purposive, 
rather than being representative of all individuals who receive s 32 orders. 
The data describes the sample’s demographic characteristics and 
longitudinal human service and criminal justice pathways. The sample is derived 
from a larger cohort of 2731 men and women,41 both Indigenous and non-
Indigenous, who have been in prison in NSW and whose cognitive impairment 
and/or mental illness diagnosis is known. The quantitative analysis examines 
aspects of identity including Indigeneity, gender and age; as well as criminal 
justice involvement over time in order to provide a nuanced account of the 
operation of diagnosed impairment and its intersections with social disadvantage 
and criminal justice pathways for individuals who are the subject of s 32. 
																																																																																																																																
Disability and/or a Psychiatric Disability in Four Local Courts’ (Diversity Services, NSW 
Department of Attorney General and Justice, 2011); NSWLRC Report No 135, above n 1; John 
Sharples et al, ‘Offending Behaviour and Mental Illness: Characteristics of a Mental Health Court 
Liaison Service’ (2003) 10(2) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 300; Ketrina A Sly et al, ‘Court 
Outcomes for Clients Referred to a Community Mental Health Court Liaison Service’ (2009) 32(2) 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 92.  
39 But see the brief references to other dimensions of identity and to broader criminal justice contact 
in Freeman, above n 38; Sharples et al, above n 38; Sly et al, above n 38. 
40 For a detailed description of the research methods, analysis and findings of the study, see Linda 
Steele, Leanne Dowse and Julian Trofimovs, ‘Section 32: A Report on the Human Service and 
Criminal Justice Pathways of People Diagnosed with Mental Health Disorder and Cognitive 
Disability in the Criminal Justice System Who Have Received Orders Pursuant to Section 32 of the 
Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW)’ (2013) <http://www.mhdcd.unsw.edu.au/ 
sites/www.mhdcd.unsw.edu.au/files/u18/Steele%2C%20Dowse%20and%20Trofimovs%20_MHD
CD%20Section%2032%20Report.pdf>. 
41 University of New South Wales, Australians with MHDCD in the CJS Project (2015) Indigenous 
Australians with Mental Health Disorders and Cognitive Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System 
<http://www.mhdcd.unsw.edu.au/australians-mhdcd-cjs-project.html>. 
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There are five study groups for the purposes of analysis, delineated on the 
basis of diagnosis. These are: 
(i) Intellectual Disability (‘ID’): Individuals with an Intellectual Disability 
diagnosis only (defined here as IQ < 70) and no Mental Health 
Disorder (‘MHD’) diagnosis. 
(ii) Borderline Intellectual Disability (‘BID’): Individuals with a Borderline 
Intellectual Disability diagnosis only (defined here as IQ =70–80) and 
no Mental Health Disorder diagnosis. 
(iii) Mental Health Disorder (‘MHD’): Individuals with a Mental Health 
Disorder diagnosis only and no Intellectual Disability or Borderline 
Intellectual Disability diagnosis. Mental Health Disorder is defined 
here as having been diagnosed with any anxiety disorder, affective 
disorder, psychosis, personality disorder or substance use disorder in 
the previous 12 months. 
(iv) Mental Health Disorder and Intellectual Disability (‘MHD_ID’): 
Individuals with a Mental Health Disorder diagnosis and an Intellectual 
Disability diagnosis. 
(v) Mental Health Disorder and Borderline Intellectual Disability 
(‘MHD_BID’): Individuals with a Mental Health Disorder diagnosis 
and a Borderline Intellectual Disability diagnosis. 
Data on the life-long human services and criminal justice involvement of 
each individual was drawn from a linked dataset42 merging existing administrative 
records from NSW criminal justice and human service agencies: Police, 
Corrections, Justice Health, Courts, Juvenile Justice, Legal Aid, Disability, 
Housing, Health and Community Services. The dataset allows detailed pathway 
analysis of the ways people who are diagnosed with Cognitive Disability (‘CD’; 
those with ID or BID) and Mental Health Disorder enter, move through, exit and 
return to the criminal justice system and an understanding of the interactions 
between the justice and human service agencies affecting them. De-identified data 
was drawn on the sample’s demographic characteristics, criminal justice contacts, 
social and health factors, disability service usage, and s 32 orders. 
Quantitative statistical analysis was undertaken to give an aggregate picture 
of the sample, with comparative analysis of study groups, including single and 
multiple diagnosis groups, including those with Cognitive Disability and Mental 
Health Disorder and according to gender and Indigenous status. The data was 
analysed in this way in order to examine the multiplicity of diagnosed impairment, 
the complex interrelationships between diagnosed impairment and demographics, 
																																																								
42 The cohort was drawn from the 2001 NSW Inmate Health Survey (‘HIS’) and from the NSW 
Department of Corrective Services State-Wide Disability Service Database (‘SDD’). This study is a 
nested study within the Australian Research Council (‘ARC’) Linkage project, ‘People with Mental 
Health Disorders and Cognitive Disabilities (MHDCD) in the Criminal Justice System (CJS) in 
NSW’, University of New South Wales — Chief Investigators: Eileen Baldry, Leanne Dowse and 
Ian Webster. Ethics approval was obtained from all of the relevant ethics bodies, including from the 
University of New South Wales Human Research Ethics Committee. See generally University of 
New South Wales, Australians with MHDCD in the CJS Project <http://www.mhdcd.unsw.edu.au/ 
australians-mhdcd-cjs-project.html>. 
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and the relationships between diagnosed impairment, disadvantage, institutional 
interventions, criminalisation and victimisation. 
V Diagnosed Impairment 
To critique diagnosed impairment in s 32, a more nuanced picture of the s 32 
subjects begins with diagnoses. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the study sample 
according to diagnostic category. 
 
Figure 1: Section 32 subjects’ data diagnostic category breakdown: raw count 
and percentages 
 
Figure 1 shows that 87% of the s 32 subjects had a Cognitive Disability 
diagnosis, and 74% had a diagnosis of Mental Health Disorder (noting that many 
are diagnosed with both). This higher proportion of s 32 subjects with the 
diagnosis of Cognitive Disability, as compared to those with a diagnosis of Mental 
Health Disorder suggests that cognitive impairment, far from being of only 
marginal significance to s 32 (particularly as compared to mental illness)43 is, at 
least for this group, at the core of the provision’s operation. 
Figure 1 shows the significance of ‘marginal’ cognitive impairment 
diagnosis to the sample. Cognitive impairment is most generally associated in 
psychological and disability literature with ‘intellectual disability’, whereas the 
diagnostic category of borderline intellectual disability sits at the margins of what 
is contemplated by this category. In the context of s 32, ‘intellectual disability’ is 
generally equated with the legislative category of ‘developmental disability’44 and, 
hence, as the diagnostic category that is typically associated with s 32’s application 
to individuals with cognitive impairment. Consequently, borderline intellectual 
																																																								
43 See, eg, Howell and Steele, above n 1, 30–2. 
44 Ibid 29–30; NSWLRC Consultation Paper No 7, above n 1, 20–3 [3.10]–[3.14]. 
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disability sits ambiguously and uneasily at the edges of the provision’s operation.45 
Of the s 32 subjects in this sample with Cognitive Disability, 40% have Borderline 
Intellectual Disability. While individuals with borderline intellectual disability 
receive s 32 orders, this diagnosis is not expressly included in the diagnostic 
categories specified in s 32(1) of the MHFP Act. 
Figure 1 also shows diagnostic complexity by the high proportion of s 32 
subjects with a complex diagnosis of Cognitive Disability and Mental Health 
Disorder (60%), rather than a single diagnosis of Cognitive Disability (26%) or a 
single diagnosis of Mental Health Disorder (13%). This feature is significant given 
that diagnostic categorisation in s 32(1) does not explicitly acknowledge complex 
diagnosis. This evidence complicates the idea of distinct categories of individuals 
characterised by reference to mental illness or cognitive impairment (or, in the 
words of s 32 itself, of the individual who is ‘developmentally disabled’, ‘suffering 
from mental illness’ or ‘suffering from a mental condition’46). Instead, it is evident 
that s 32 subjects are diagnostically complex, a fact that remains unacknowledged 
in the currently bounded diagnostic categories used in s 32. 
VI Beyond Diagnosed Impairment: Other Dimensions of 
Politicised Identity 
The possibility that the s 32 subjects are anything other than impaired is not fully 
explored in the academic research on s 32 and is noted only in passing by the 
advocacy and law reform discussion of s 32.47 Motivated by the critical disability 
studies scholarship that illuminates the significance of intersectionality to the 
identity and experiences of people with disability,48 this part focuses on gender and 
Indigeneity and the interrelationships between these characteristics and Cognitive 
Disability and Mental Health Disorder. Examination of other dimensions of 
politicised identity that might also be significant (including refugee status, 
sexuality, cultural and linguistic diversity and other dimensions of race such as 
‘whiteness’) is beyond the scope of the available data. 




45 Howell and Steele, above n 1, 29–30; NSWLRC Consultation Paper No 7, above n 1, 20–3 [3.10]–[3.14]. 
46 MHFP Act s 32(1)(a). 
47 See, eg, Freeman, above n 38, 3–4; Sharples et al, above n 38, 304–14; Sly et al, above n 38, 94–9. 
48 See above n 27. 
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Table 1: Section 32 subjects’ demographics: raw count and percentage totals* 
 
Demographics ID BID MHD MHD_ID MHD_BID Total 
Gender 
Male (‘M’) 19 19 17 41 36 
132 
(88.6%) 




Indigenous 4 6 2 16 14 
42 
(28.2%) 






M 4 5 2 13  13  
37 
(24.8%) 





M 15 14  15  28 23  
95 
(63.8%) 
F 0 0 3  7 2  
12 
(8.1%) 
* Key to diagnoses: ID = Intellectual Disability; BID = Borderline Intellectual Disability;  
MHD = Mental Health; MHD_ID = Mental Health and Intellectual Disability;  
MHD_BID = Mental Health and Borderline Intellectual Disability. 
A Gender 
Table 1 indicates significant intersection between dimensions of gender and 
Cognitive Disability and Mental Health Disorder in relation to the s 32 subjects, 
with the sample being overwhelmingly male (88.6%; 132 of 149). While it is not 
possible to draw conclusions about women from the small sample (n=17), it can be 
noted that diagnostic complexity is a hallmark of this group, with 13 of the 17 
women represented in the sample having complex diagnoses of Cognitive 
Disability and Mental Health Disorder. 
B Indigenous Australians 
Just over 28% of the s 32 subjects in the sample are Indigenous Australians (42 of 
149). Almost all these individuals have a diagnosis of Cognitive Disability, with 
only 2 of the 42 having a single diagnosis of Mental Health Disorder. Nearly 75% 
of this group (30 of 42) have a complex diagnosis: 16 of 42 have Mental Health 
and Intellectual Disability and a further 14 of 42 have Mental Health and 
Borderline Intellectual Disability. 
C Gender and Indigenous Australians 
In relation to the intersection of Indigeneity and gender, male Indigenous 
Australians make up almost 25% of the total sample (37 of 149), with over half of 
these having complex diagnoses (26 of 37 made up of 13 of 37 having Mental 
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Health and Intellectual Disability and 13 of 37 have Mental Health and Borderline 
Intellectual Disability). Indigenous Australian females constitute only a minority of 
all Indigenous Australians in the sample, similar to the proportion of female s 32 
subjects in general. Again, while the sample size is too limited for meaningful 
statistical analysis, it is notable that all but one of the five Indigenous women have 
complex diagnoses. 
Taken together, the evidence presented in this and the preceding parts of 
this article suggest that the s 32 subjects are characterised by marginal and 
complex diagnoses and by other politicised dimensions of identity that intersect 
with diagnosed impairment.49 This highlights that the s 32 subjects do not exist in a 
biomedical state, void of social and political context, but rather that social and 
political dimensions are central to an understanding of who these individuals are 
and to understanding the broader meaning of their impairment.  
VII Diagnosed Impairment, Politicised Identity and Social 
Disadvantage 
This part discusses patterns of social disadvantage experienced by the s 32 subjects 
in the sample and explores the ways in which social disadvantage, gender and 
Indigeneity intersect with Cognitive Disability and Mental Health Disorder. Social 
disadvantage is demonstrated via incidence of usage of human services typically 
associated with economic and social need including out-of-home care, 
homelessness, housing services (tenancy, rent assistance and evictions), Legal Aid, 
and disability service support for justice associated needs. 
Table 2 shows the pattern of government human services agency contacts 
for the s 32 subjects in the sample. 
Table 2 indicates considerable social disadvantage experienced by s 32 
subjects. In general, the table indicates a high incidence of service usage of human 
services typically associated with economic and social need compounded with 
some difficulties accessing these services. 
	  
																																																								
49 See also Baldry et al, A Predictable and Preventable Path, above n 29. These intersections between 
Indigeneity and cognitive impairment are also acknowledged in existing law reform and advocacy 
reports: see, eg, Calma, above n 29; Sotiri, McGee and Baldry, above n 29. 
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Table 2: Section 32 subjects’ agency interactions: raw count and percentage 
totals* 
Agency Interactions ID BID MHD MHD_ID MHD_BID Total 
Out-of-
home Care 











NFPA 7 9  14  34  24  
88 
(59.1%) 














































Applied 7.54 18.50 8.1 13.08 9.50 11.34 























9  14 19  28  32  
102 
(68.5%) 
* Key to diagnoses: ID = Intellectual Disability; BID = Borderline Intellectual Disability;  
MHD = Mental Health; MHD_ID = Mental Health and Intellectual Disability;  
MHD_BID = Mental Health and Borderline Intellectual Disability. 
Key to government human services agency interactions: OOHC = out-of-home care;  
NFPA = no fixed place of abode; ADHC CJP = Department of Ageing Disability and Home Care, 
Community Justice Program. 
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A Early Life 
In relation to dynamics in their early lives, 14.1% of the sample have been in 
out-of-home care as children (21 of 149), considerably higher than the rate of 
out-of-home care in the general population of less than 1%.50 This is significant in 
light of other critical disability studies research which has identified the 
relationship between early life disadvantage, poor educational outcomes (notably 
school exclusion) and criminalisation vis-à-vis people with disability (particularly 
of racial minorities).51 
B Homelessness and Housing 
In relation to homelessness, 59% (88 of 149) of the sample have been homeless52 
at some point in their lives. Even within data limitations that mean this is likely an 
under-representation of actual homelessness, this high proportion of individuals 
who have been homeless suggests a significant dynamic of social marginalisation. 
In this group, there is a strong association between complex diagnosis and 
homelessness (34 of 88 have Mental Health Disorder and Intellectual Disability 
diagnoses with a further 24 of 88 having Mental Health Disorder and Borderline 
Intellectual Disability). 
Over half of the sample (57%) has applied for public housing (85 of 149). 
Of this group who have applied for public housing, approximately 60% (52 of 85) 
were successful in obtaining tenancies. Of the whole sample, 13% (20 of 149) had 
been evicted from Housing NSW housing. Expressing a need for housing and/or 
being evicted from public housing is indicative of social disadvantage and while 
some individuals do have positive housing outcomes, it is clear that for many other 
s 32 subjects at times this need is not met, suggesting further social disadvantage. 
C Legal Aid 
The overwhelming majority of the sample (86%) has applied for Legal Aid at some 
time in their lives (128 of 149). On average, these individuals made 11 applications 
and had 2 cases refused. These findings are positive to the extent that they indicate 
that the s 32 subjects are gaining access to Legal Aid to support them in legal 
matters. Yet, these findings also point to this group having a number of justiciable 
problems that might extend beyond the criminal jurisdiction.53 
																																																								
50 Eileen Baldry, Leanne Dowse and Melissa Clarence, ‘People with Mental and Cognitive 
Disabilities: Pathways into Prison’ (Australian Correctional Leadership Program, October 2011) 7. 
51 Watts and Erevelles, above n 28. 
52 Here ‘homeless’ specifically means a notation in the data as ‘no fixed place of abode’ or ‘NFPA’. 
This is an under-representation of homelessness in the sample, as currently homelessness can only 
be detected when an individual has received a service while homeless or has come into contact with 
the criminal justice system. Moreover, NFPA recorded homelessness does not include marginalised 
and insecure housing such as boarding houses. 
53 See, eg, Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, ‘Legal Needs of People with a 
Disability in Australia’ (Updating Justice No 16, November 2012); A O’Grady et al, ‘Disability, 
Social Exclusion and the Consequential Experience of Justiciable Problems’ (2004) 19(3) 
Disability & Society 259. 
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D Disability Justice Support 
A further dimension of social disadvantage in adulthood is the low incidence of 
access to community disability services. Of those with Cognitive Disability in the 
sample (ID and BID alone or ID_MHD or BID_MHD: 129 of 149), only 16% (24 
of 129) had received disability services from the NSW government disability 
agency (‘disability service’ or as referred to in Table 2 as ‘ADHC’ services).54 The 
picture is no better for access to specialist community forensic disability support, 
with only 15.4% of s 32 subjects (23 of 149) receiving this specialist service.55 
Given s 32 orders typically require a treatment plan and evidence of disability 
service access, it is worth noting that there is a high proportion of s 32 subjects 
with Cognitive Disability who have not received disability services — although 
some of these s 32 subjects might receive NGO disability services that are funded 
by the agency, as opposed to services direct from the agency itself. Moreover, 
those with Cognitive Disability on average first received disability services at a 
surprisingly older age of 31.9 years. Given that the average age of first police 
contact for the s 32 subjects with Cognitive Disability is 17 years (as will be 
discussed in Pt VIII), this indicates that this group may be in the criminal justice 
system for quite some time prior to receiving disability support services. 
Individuals with a single diagnosis of Intellectual Disability had the greatest 
access to disability services with over 50% (10 of 19) having received a service, 
while those with a complex diagnosis of Borderline Intellectual Disability and 
Mental Health Disorder had the lowest access with only 18% (7 of 39) receiving a 
disability service. When considered in conjunction with the disadvantage 
experienced by those with Borderline Intellectual Disability in accessing generic 
human services such as housing and Legal Aid, it is evident that this group 
experience particularly high levels of social disadvantage, but relatively low levels 
of support.56 Indigenous Australians with Cognitive Disability in the sample are 
particularly marginalised in relation to accessing disability services, with only 17% 
(8 of 47) of those accessing disability services being Indigenous Australians, 
despite this group making up 28.2% of all of the s 32 subjects.57 
																																																								
54 Since the data was drawn on 30 April 2008, there have been some significant and ongoing reforms 
in relation to community forensic disability service provision. Moreover, it is likely that some 
individuals in the sample accessed support services that are not captured in this data, such as non-
government organisation (‘NGO’) disability services. Further, it cannot be assumed that every s 32 
subject has applied for ADHC services, such that not being in receipt of ADHC services cannot be 
automatically associated with a positive refusal by ADHC of an application for services. See also 
Steele, Dowse and Trofimovs, above n 40, 80–83. 
55 As was the case in relation to ADHC services generally, the lower proportion of the s 32 subjects 
who received the specialist community forensic disability support service should be considered in 
light of the resource and eligibility restrictions of this service: ibid. 
56 The findings in relation to ADHC service use for s 32 subjects with Borderline Intellectual 
Disability might reflect ADHC eligibility requirements concerning IQ cut-offs as well as issues 
around the lack of formal diagnoses or an inability to make an application due to social 
circumstances. It might also reflect a lower level of demand for disability services by this group 
who might not identify as having a disability or as a disability service user, or might not be aware 
of these services if they have not historically been associated with the disability community or 
disability service sector. 
57 In the Australian context, research suggests a complex network of factors related to low disability 
service access as well as issues around the meaning and significance of disability in Indigenous 
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The findings presented in Parts V–VII demonstrate that many of the s 32 
subjects have marginal and complex diagnoses and that these diagnoses intersect 
with gender and Indigeneity. Moreover, many of these individuals experience high 
levels of social disadvantage. Together these show that diagnosed impairment falls 
short in capturing the individual and institutional dimensions of social 
disadvantage and obscures important systemic dimensions. 
VIII Criminal Justice Pathways 
The article now turns from diagnosis, identity and social disadvantage to discuss 
the criminal justice pathways of the s 32 subjects as alleged offenders. This part 
begins with a description of the extent and characteristics of s 32 orders as 
experienced by those in the sample, and then moves beyond the legal event of the 
s 32 order to look at the pathways over time these individuals take through the 
criminal justice system as alleged offenders. 
A Section 32 Use 
All but one of the sample received their s 32 order/s as an adult. Individuals have 
an average of two such orders, with a range from one (nine individuals) to ten (one 
individual),58 with just under half (46%) having received only one s 32 order. 
Viewed in isolation, the incidence of s 32 orders might indicate that the s 32 
subjects have had contact with the criminal justice system only a small number of 
times. However, an examination of their longitudinal criminal justice context 
reveals that s 32 orders are a small part of more complex criminal justice pathways. 
B Early and Repeated Criminal Justice Contact 
The s 32 subjects were, on average, aged 17.2 years at their first police contact 
(‘FPC’), although it should be noted that there is a considerable spread across the 
sample in relation to the age of FPC and that some were as young as 9 years old at 
their age of FPC.59 Thirty-six per cent were clients of the NSW Department of 
Juvenile Justice (‘DJJ’) and, of these, 75% have been in DJJ custody. These 
findings indicate that individuals have been in the criminal justice system for some 
time and that the majority have early experiences of incarceration, before they 
receive a s 32 order. Recalling also the poor educational outcomes and high 
incidence of out-of-home care discussed in Part VII, these children have difficult 
childhoods and experience criminalisation and institutional failure across 
institutions. 
																																																																																																																																
culture and communities: see above n 29. On a broader level of possible intersections of disability 
service access, social disadvantage and race, see Stubblefield’s research on African Americans with 
cognitive impairment, which has noted this coupling of a high incidence of cognitive impairment 
and low disability service access: Anna Stubblefield, ‘The Entanglement of Race and Cognitive 
Dis/Ability’ in Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson (eds), Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to 
Moral Philosophy (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 293. 
58 There are no available statistics on the total number of s 32 orders made during the research period. 
59 See Steele, Dowse and Trofimovs, above n 40, 36–8. 
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There are important intersections between diagnosis, other dimensions of 
politicised identity and early police contact. Indigenous Australians in the sample 
have a lower average age of FPC of 14.9 years, as compared to 17.4 years for non-
Indigenous Australians. Of all Indigenous Australians in the sample, 57% have 
been DJJ clients, as compared to 27% of non-Indigenous Australian DJJ clients. 
While Indigenous Australians constitute 28% of the sample, they make up 53% of 
those who have been in DJJ custody. These findings confirm the concerns 
expressed in advocacy reports about the high incidence of Indigenous Australians 
with cognitive impairment in juvenile justice custody.60 
Individuals in the sample experience contact with the criminal justice 
system at a young age, including police contact and incarceration during 
childhood. These findings (particularly when compounded with the findings on 
social disadvantage and institutional failure) draw attention to the longstanding 
nature of their criminal justice contact and the significance of institutions to the 
criminalisation of the group. They raise questions about the extent to which s 32 
orders focused on diagnosed impairment can address these temporal and 
institutional dimensions of the criminalisation of s 32 subjects. 
Individuals in the sample also have repeated criminal justice contact — with 
an average of 97 person of interest (‘POI’) contacts with police. This is a high 
number given the average age of the sample at the time of the data draw is 35.2 
years. Those with a complex diagnosis of Cognitive Disability and Mental Health 
Disorder have higher average POI contacts (124 contacts) than those with a single 
diagnosis of Cognitive Disability (85 contacts) and a single diagnosis of Mental 
Health Disorder (69 contacts). 
On average, each individual has been convicted of 38 offences. These 
convictions continue to occur despite the individuals having received s 32 orders, 
and the orders themselves are a small proportion of the convicted matters (recalling 
that the average number of s 32 orders is 2). Further, the average number of 
convicted offences is much lower than the average number of POI contacts with 
police (97), illustrating that these individuals have a level of contact with police 
beyond that associated with the offences in relation to which they are ultimately 
convicted. 
Clear differences are evident in relation to complexity of impairment, where 
those with a single diagnosis of Cognitive Disability or Mental Health Disorder 
have, on average, 80 POI contacts and 34 convictions, and those with complex 
diagnosis of Cognitive Disability and Mental Health Disorder have, on average, 
128 POI contacts and 40 convictions. This suggests more intensive criminalisation 
is associated with complexity of diagnosis. 
When POI contacts and convictions are read in conjunction with the 
findings on FPC and DJJ, it is clear that many of the s 32 subjects come into 
contact with the police during their childhood and, in turn, cycle in and out of the 
criminal justice system for a significant part of their life. Moreover, these 
individuals appear to be subject to ongoing criminalisation as evidenced by the 
																																																								
60 See, eg, Calma, above n 29. 
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high number of POI contacts — which indicate periodic contact with police as a 
potential offender, as opposed to only having contact with the criminal justice 
system in relation to the incidents the subject of the s 32 orders. It is important to 
note that POI police contact does not necessarily result in formal criminal charges, 
such that this group’s contact with police is not only broader than their s 32 matter, 
but also broader than the matters with which they have been charged. 
Individuals in the sample tend to be convicted of offences at the less serious 
end of the scale of criminality. Non-aggravated assault (the least serious form of 
assault) was the most frequently convicted offence, with a total of 770 convictions 
across the sample. For 26% of the group, non-aggravated assault is also the most 
frequent of the most serious convicted offence arising across the cohort. The 
second most frequently convicted offence is theft (except motor vehicles) with a 
total of 460 convictions, followed by property damage with a total of 379 
convictions. There were no instances of murder, only one instance of manslaughter 
(recorded for an individual with a single diagnosis of Mental Health Disorder), 
four instances of attempted murder (all individuals with complex diagnoses of 
Cognitive Disability and Mental Health Disorder) and two instances of driving 
causing death (s 32 subject/s with a single diagnosis of Mental Health Disorder). 
Breach of domestic violence orders, offensive behaviour, offensive language and 
trespass were other frequently convicted offences. The finding that the sample 
came into contact with the police and courts generally in relation to low-level 
criminal offences suggests that while this group do not necessarily pose a serious 
threat to the community, they experience ongoing criminalisation. 
C Incarceration 
A further dimension of the picture of the criminal justice pathways of the sample is 
incarceration and its effects. Individuals had, on average, 12 adult (Department of 
Corrective Services or ‘DCS’) custodial episodes and, on average, spent a total 
number of 1033 days in adult custody for all those custodial episodes. Thus, these 
individuals were, on average, likely to cycle in and out of prison on short prison 
stays and for some this began at a young age through incarceration in juvenile 
justice detention. Low penalties and the high frequency of movement in and out of 
prison generates its own disadvantage as individuals are constantly dislocated in 
housing, service use, drug rehabilitation, and personal relationships. 
On average, those with a complex diagnosis of Cognitive Disability and 
Mental Health Disorder had higher numbers of custodial episodes (14) and total 
days in custody (1181) for all custodial episodes than for individuals with a single 
diagnosis of Cognitive Disability or Mental Health Disorder, who had an average 
of nine custodial episodes and an average total of 806 days in custody. This 
suggests that the length and frequency of incarceration may be associated with the 
relative complexity of diagnosis. These findings further indicate that those with 
complex diagnoses experience multiple problems including greater disadvantage 
and more cycling in and out of the criminal justice system.  
Similar patterns of intensification are also associated with Indigeneity. On 
average, Indigenous Australians in the sample have roughly the same number of 
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custodial episodes as their non-Indigenous counterparts. However, on average, 
Indigenous Australians have longer prison stays — with a higher total number of 
custody days (1259 days) for all custodial episodes than their non-Indigenous 
counterparts (944 days). 
A further dimension to the criminal justice pathways of the sample is the 
significant vulnerability they experience in incarceration. 62% of individuals in the 
sample have recorded instances of self-harm in custody. There is noticeable 
disparity in relation to self-harm in terms of complexity of diagnosis: 69% of those 
with a diagnosis of Cognitive Disability and Mental Health Disorder have recorded 
instances of self-harm, whereas 53% of those with a single diagnosis have 
self-harm instances recorded. This suggests a higher incidence of self-harm 
associated with complex diagnosis. 
The findings presented in Parts VIII(A)–(C) show that s 32 orders form a 
small part of the overall criminal justice pathways of this group as alleged 
offenders, and that while the individuals are subject to a high number of 
convictions, they experience even higher numbers of criminal charges and POI 
contacts with police. This evidence provides a material basis for the negative 
effects of the criminal justice system, notably incarceration. While the s 32 
subjects clearly have frequent contact with police as POIs, they also have other 
forms of contact with police which are intimately linked to their criminalisation 
and hence are significant to the criminal law dimensions of s 32. 
D Police Contact as a Victim of Crime 
Police contact as a victim of crime is significant to the operation of criminal law in 
relation to the s 32 subjects. On average, the sample have had 15 victim contacts, 
representing an average 12% of their total POI and victim contacts with police. 
Those with a single diagnosis of Intellectual Disability experienced the greatest 
proportion of their police contacts as victims (18%). This is one rare instance in the 
findings where those with a single diagnosis of Cognitive Disability experience 
greater levels of disadvantage than those in the complex diagnostic categories. 
While small numbers in the sample mean extrapolation for women who 
receive s 32 orders is not possible, it is interesting to note that females in the 
sample have higher average numbers of recorded victim contacts when compared 
to their male counterparts. This gives further nuance to existing research on the 
intersection of female incarceration, sexual violence and trauma61 and mirrors 
previous work on the association between complex diagnosis and criminalisation 
and victimisation.62 This is significant in light of the role of violence in the 
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emergence of disability, notably recent statistics on the relationship between 
gender, Indigeneity, domestic violence and acquired brain injury.63 
Indigenous Australians in the sample have lower average numbers of 
recorded victim contacts when compared to their non-Indigenous counterparts, 
with an average of 11 victim contacts with police, as compared to an average 17 
victim contacts for non-Indigenous Australians. This differential may be more 
likely to be indicative of rates of reporting of victimisation and police recognition 
of victimisation than of actual victimisation, given that the rate is of victim 
contacts with police rather than events of victimisation. 
The finding presented above indicates that police contact for this group is 
multidimensional and that members of the sample are in the criminal justice 
system in a more complex way than only as alleged offenders. It is important to 
note that the quantitative data cannot provide the context in which victim police 
contact occurs nor the outcome of these victim police contacts (that is, 10 victim 
contacts with police does not necessarily mean 10 resolved matters). This is 
particularly important given research on attrition of complaints of violence made 
by people with disability generally (particularly women with cognitive and 
psychosocial disability).64 
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A further dimension of police contact for these individuals is that related to 
civil mental health legislation, to which the article now turns. 
E Police Contact and Civil Mental Health Legislation 
The s 32 subjects in the sample had contact with police under civil mental health 
legislation. This form of contact was specific to impairment and, more specifically, 
to police perceptions of their being mentally ill. As such, it demonstrates one way 
in which impairment provides additional opportunities for criminalisation 
(discussed in Part IX below). Police have powers under civil mental health 
legislation to deal coercively with individuals if they appear to have a mental 
illness. Under this legislation, police can take an individual to a hospital for 
assessment by a medical practitioner with the view of possible ‘scheduling’ (that 
is, obtaining legal authority to coercively admit and detain) the individual to a 
mental health facility for involuntary containment and treatment. Apprehension 
under these circumstances indicates that police believe the person is experiencing a 
mental health issue at the time of contact, although this does not necessarily mean 
that the individual will subsequently receive a mental health related diagnosis and 
receive treatment; rather it means that the police believe that individual’s 
behaviour is due to such impairment. 
Seventy per cent of the sample have had police contact through civil mental 
health legislation. For this group, contact pursuant to civil mental health legislation 
is an additional means of police contact. This might be expected and might point to 
police using discretion against charging. Importantly, civil mental health 
legislation expressly excludes ‘developmental disability’ from the definition of 
‘mental illness’.65 Therefore, individuals with Intellectual Disability or Borderline 
Intellectual Disability do not fall within the legislative definition unless they also 
have a Mental Health Disorder diagnosis. However, 64% of the sample who had 
single diagnoses of Cognitive Disability (that is, those with no diagnosis of Mental 
Health Disorder) had contact with police in relation to the use of the civil mental 
health legislation. This suggests that mental health diagnosis alone is not the 
distinguishing factor for contact with police through civil mental health legislation. 
Thus, the sample came into contact with police in relation to their (actual or 
perceived) mental illness, suggesting this is a further dynamic of their 
criminalisation. This civil legal framework effectively creates an additional (and 
impairment-specific) opportunity for contact with the criminal justice system (and 
specifically, the police). While the problem of mental health ‘frequent presenters’66 
to police and of mental and public health systems refusing to admit individuals 
brought to them by police has been noted elsewhere,67 the police use of mental 
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health legislation specifically in relation to individuals diagnosed with cognitive 
impairment has not been explored in existing scholarship. 
The picture cumulatively developed here of the criminal justice pathways of 
s 32 subjects is of early and ongoing contact with police, cycling in and out of 
custody for low-level offences, as well as contact with police as victims of crime. 
Added to this is the significance of mental health related police contact to the 
criminal justice pathways of s 32 subjects. This not only shows the complexity and 
multiple layers of police contact (that exceed the moment of the s 32 order), but 
also, of concern, the impairment-specific possibilities for additional police contact 
and the significance of police perceptions of mental illness to this contact (given 
that many individuals did not, in fact, have any formal diagnoses of mental illness). 
The complexity of criminal justice contact over time raises questions about 
how s 32 fits into the variety of ways the criminal justice system is implicated in 
lives of people with disability, as well as how s 32 confirms the legitimacy and 
beneficence of this involvement, rather than acknowledging criminal law and the 
criminal justice system as themselves part of the problem. So, while prison is 
clearly negative for this sample and hence it might advantage individuals to not be 
in prison via a s 32 order, the issue of criminalisation goes beyond prison to 
multiple legal, spatial, temporal and institutional dimensions of criminalisation. 
Section 32 orders (in being criminal law orders) do not move individuals outside of 
these broader dimensions of criminalisation. 
IX Thinking beyond Diagnosis 
To this point, this article has drawn on critical disability studies scholarship to 
critique the centrality of the legal subject of diagnosed impairment to s 32’s 
coercive interventions through disability services and mental health treatment. In 
analysing empirical data on a sample of 149 subjects of s 32 orders, it is important 
to reiterate that the sample utilised for the study did not capture individuals who 
had not been prisoners. As such, the findings did not necessarily reflect the 
experiences of all persons diagnosed with cognitive impairment and/or mental 
illness in the criminal justice system who have received s 32 orders. However, the 
level of detail accessible in the data describes the experiences of a purposively 
selected group and, for the first time, provides insights into the intersections 
between marginal and complex diagnoses including cognitive impairment and 
mental health disorder, with other aspects of politicised identity and social 
disadvantage in childhood and adulthood. Analysis has further highlighted 
compound criminal justice contact over time, and the significance of victim and 
mental health contact. 
These findings problematise the characterisation of the legal subjects of s 32 
in terms of an internal, individual pathologised diagnosed impairment and, in turn, 
provide a material basis for contesting the coercive effects of s 32. Specifically, the 
findings point to three particular implications for a more thorough critique of the 
coercive effects of diversion. 
204 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 38:179 
A The Legal Category of Diagnosed Impairment 
The first implication of the findings presented here is the need for future scholarly, 
legal, policy and law reform analysis of s 32 to consider how and why individuals 
with cognitive impairment and/or mental illness come to be reduced to impaired 
legal subjects for the purpose of s 32, and what happens in the process to the 
social, political, historical, material and institutional dimensions of their identities 
and circumstances. The findings provide a stark and important contrast to the 
construction of the legal subject in s 32 purely or primarily in terms of diagnosed 
impairment. They prompt the questions of why s 32 does not acknowledge other 
aspects of politicised identity, and where these aspects go in the legal process of 
determining a s 32 application. The analysis provides an empirical basis for the 
suggestion that s 32 is equally exclusionary or silencing of other dimensions of 
identity and lived experience — dimensions that are widely understood to have 
significant social and political implications for people with disability in the 
criminal justice system. This has implications not only for how criminal law can 
act on individuals, but also for broader consideration of the limits of criminal law 
in achieving social justice if criminal law cannot respond to and itself is implicated 
in the complexity of individuals’ marginalisation. 
B Legitimating or Critiquing Criminal Law? 
Second, the empirical findings that highlight this sample of s 32 subjects as cycling 
in and out of prison, experiencing early incarceration and engaging in self-harm in 
prison all suggest the role the criminal justice system and criminal law have in 
sustaining criminalisation, social disadvantage and vulnerability and signal the 
failure of the criminal justice system itself. This prompts questions about the extent 
to which s 32 is ever capable of addressing the disadvantage, vulnerability and 
violence that is authorised by criminal law itself. The findings also signal the need 
to consider how criminal law and the criminal justice system are constructed in s 
32, and how the many violent, harmful and negative effects of criminal law and the 
criminal justice system are acknowledged or ignored in the process of making s 32 
orders. 
If s 32 cannot acknowledge and address these issues, then the question 
arises as to the terms on which the interventions enabled through s 32 orders are 
constructed as necessary and legitimate. 
C The Limits of Managing Offending through Disability 
Services 
The third implication from the findings is how criminal law acts on people with 
disability through diversion into the community disability service system. The 
study presented has given a nuanced picture of the criminal justice contacts of the 
individuals who have received s 32 orders by creating a longitudinal account of 
criminal justice contact. This showed that, on average, s 32 subjects had early and 
ongoing contact with police and multiple episodes of custody, in stark contrast to 
the very low number of s 32 orders that this sample of individuals had received and 
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the relatively late timing of these orders. The significance of juvenile justice 
contact (notably, incarceration for Indigenous Australians) and the negligible 
number of s 32 orders as young persons is indicative of the quantitatively minor 
and temporally late place of s 32 in the overall criminal justice pathways of the 
individuals. This means that criminalisation and its negative effects are well 
entrenched in individuals’ lives by the time s 32 orders are made in adulthood. 
Therefore, it is likely that there may be complex systemic issues that individuals 
face, beyond their life circumstances specifically related to the subject charges, 
which s 32 might be incapable of recognising and addressing. This is particularly 
the case for the females (notably, Indigenous females) who had received s 32 
orders. Analysis also demonstrates the ways that complexity of diagnosis and other 
dimensions of politicised identity intersect with police contact and incarceration. 
The findings prompt questions about the extent to which it is appropriate to 
have an individual criminal law intervention premised specifically on, and acting 
through, diagnosed impairment, when the data suggests that there are so many 
other pervasive social, systemic (and criminal justice) dimensions to the 
disadvantage and contact with the criminal justice system experienced by people 
who receive s 32 orders. 
The use of community disability services in the specific context of the 
criminal justice system and s 32 implies belief in the humane nature of these 
criminal law interventions,68 yet the findings highlight the limits of using disability 
services to manage offending. In the case of people with cognitive impairment, 
which is recognised to be lifelong and permanent, rehabilitative therapy directed at 
the impairment itself is of limited use. Instead, community disability support is 
generally angled toward supporting individuals to maximise their capacity in 
managing the issues of daily life. While skill and capacity building and disability 
support may go some way to addressing risk factors for offending, these supports 
in and of themselves also fail to address the criminogenic effects of poverty, 
intergenerational disadvantage, institutional racism and disablism and the myriad 
other factors that have been demonstrated in the findings of this research that may 
act to propel this group toward offending and incarceration. 
Critical disability studies scholarship has recognised the depoliticising 
nature of diagnosed impairment and critiqued, as itself disabling, many of the 
interventions traditionally associated with contemporary disability service systems 
that act primarily on impairment. The research of some critical criminologists has 
also highlighted the role of psychological and medical services in prison as 
depoliticising the violence of incarceration.69 Taken together these critiques 
suggest the need to consider the coercive effects of s 32 that are premised on 
intervention and amelioration of impairment, while bracketing off impairment 
itself from the social context in which it arises and the social processes that see it 
become entwined with offending for some individuals. This highlights the ways in 
which the use of community disability services in s 32 reconciles the discourses of 
support, empowerment and inclusion with which they are typically associated and 
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their coercive and punitive effects in the state’s administration of criminal law. 
Humane motivations for community disability services also mask the coercive and 
punitive effects those services can have on individuals with cognitive impairment 
in the criminal law context of s 32. Here, there is the risk that discourses of rights 
and inclusion might be used to legitimise what might be viewed as punitive, 
oppressive or disciplinary in other contexts.70 
X Concluding Comments 
This article has raised questions about the role of criminal law and the criminal 
justice system vis-à-vis non-convicted individuals with cognitive impairment and/or 
mental illness in the criminal justice system. While s 32 might arguably perform an 
important function by identifying people in the community who need help and 
linking them with services, we have argued that this function is limited because 
diversion acts only on impairment (in a narrow, diagnostic sense) and its 
consequences, and obviates attention to the complex social production of impaired 
offenders. The ultimate question here is a much deeper one — should criminal law 
be fulfilling this role or does its role signal a broader social failure to respond to 
marginality and its complex causation in this group of individuals? Without question, 
s 32 — as a short-term measure — has benefits over incarceration, but its immediate 
function simultaneously prevents engagement in a deeper consideration of where s 
32 might fit both in broader issues faced by individuals with cognitive impairment 
and/or mental illness in the criminal justice system and in a political vision for 
addressing marginalisation of people with disability in the wider social landscape. 
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